Descent and penalization techniques for equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints by Bigi, Giancarlo & Passacantando, Mauro
Descent and Penalization Techniques
for Equilibrium Problems with Nonlinear Constraints
Giancarlo Bigi1 Mauro Passacantando2
Abstract
This paper deals with equilibrium problems with nonlinear constraints. Exploiting a
gap function which relies on a polyhedral approximation of the feasible region, we propose
two descent methods. They are both based on the minimization of a suitable exact
penalty function, but they use different rules for updating the penalization parameter
and they rely on different types of line search. The convergence of both algorithms is
proved under standard assumptions.
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1 Introduction
The equilibrium problem provides a general setting to formulate a large number of problems
such as scalar and vector optimization, variational inequality, fixed point, complementarity,
saddle points and noncooperative games in a unique format (see [1,2] and references therein).
A huge number of applications have been developed in different areas such as economics, envi-
ronment, transportation, information technology and telecommunications: some recent papers
focused on oligopolistic and spatial price markets [3–5], auction and financial markets [6–8],
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risk management [9], climate policies [10,11], traffic and pricing over telecommunication net-
works or over public roads [12–14], clouding computing [15, 16], power allocation in radio
systems [17,18], internet advertising [19].
Several kinds of methods to solve equilibrium problems have been proposed (see, for
instance, the recent survey [1]). One popular approach relies on the reformulation of the
equilibrium problem as an optimization problem through appropriate gap or D-gap functions:
many ad hoc descent methods for minimizing the chosen gap function have been developed
(see [13, 14, 20–28]). Most of them require the computation of the minimum of a convex
function over the (convex) feasible region of the equilibrium problem just to evaluate the
gap function at a given point. Therefore, this evaluation could be computationally expensive
when the feasible region is described by nonlinear (convex) constraints.
Recently, a gap function, which uses a polyhedral approximation of the feasible region, has
been introduced in [14]. This paper introduces two descent methods for solving equilibrium
problems with nonlinear constraints, exploiting this new gap function. They are both based on
a search direction which could be unfeasible, unlike most of the known algorithms. Therefore,
some penalization techniques are needed: an exact penalty term is introduced and a descent
direction for the penalized gap function is available, provided that the penalization parameter
is small enough. It is worthy to remark that the penalization parameter is updated throughout
the iterations of the algorithms whenever it is needed.
These new methods have some better features than most of the available descent methods.
At each iteration, a convex optimization problem with linear constraints is solved instead of
a convex problem with nonlinear constraints, as in [13, 21, 23, 25, 26]. Moreover, the key
assumption for convergence is weaker than those for the methods proposed in [21, 25, 26].
Finally, the parameters are bounded away from zero while they might go to zero, and thus
give numerical instability, in the methods developed in [13,14,23].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some well-known definitions and results
about gap functions for equilibrium problems, and a key lemma on the penalized gap function
is proved. Section 3 provides the two new solution methods and their convergence is proved
under standard assumptions. Finally, Section 4 contains some final remarks and comparisons




































































We consider the following equilibrium problem:
find x∗ ∈ C such that f(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EP )
where C ⊆ Rn is closed and convex and f : Rn × Rn → R is a bifunction. Throughout the
paper, the following basic assumptions are made:
– The feasible set C is bounded and it is defined by convex inequalities, i.e.,
C := {x ∈ Rn : ci(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m},
where ci : Rn → R are convex functions.
– The ci’s are twice continuously differentiable and Slater constraint qualification holds,
i.e., there is xˆ ∈ Rn such that ci(xˆ) < 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
– The bifunction f is continuously differentiable, f(x, ·) is convex, f(x, x) = 0 for all
x ∈ D, where D is a bounded polyhedron containing C.
The above assumptions guarantee that (EP ) admits at least one solution (see, for in-
stance, [29]).
A function g : C → R is said to be a gap function for (EP ) iff g is non-negative on
C, and x∗ solves (EP ) if and only if x∗ ∈ C and g(x∗) = 0. Thus, gap functions allow to
reformulate an equilibrium problem as a global optimization problem, whose optimal value is
known a priori. In order to build gap functions with good smoothness properties, it is helpful
to consider a continuously differentiable auxiliary bifunction h : Rn ×Rn → R which satisfies
the following conditions:
– h(x, y) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ D and h(z, z) = 0 for all z ∈ D,
– h(x, ·) is strictly convex for all x ∈ D,
– ∇yh(z, z) = 0 for all z ∈ D,



































































If all the conditions on f and h which involve D actually hold on the whole Rn, then any
bounded polyhedron D such that C ⊆ D can be considered.
Given any α > 0, a well-known gap function (see, for instance, [26]) is
φα(x) = −min
y∈C
{f(x, y) + αh(x, y)} .
Several descent methods based on the minimization of the gap function φα have been devel-
oped [13,14,21,25,26]. However, computing φα(x) require the solution of a convex optimiza-
tion problem with nonlinear constraints, which may be computationally expensive.
Recently, the gap function φα has been modified by replacing the feasible region C by its
polyhedral approximation at each considered point [14], namely introducing the function
ϕα(x) = − min
y∈P (x)
{f(x, y) + αh(x, y)} , (1)
where
P (x) = {y ∈ D : ci(x) + 〈∇ci(x), y − x〉 ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}.
The polyhedron D guarantees the boundedness of P (x): in fact, the linearization of the
constraints alone could be not enough for it, even though C itself is bounded.
Since the inner optimization problem in (1) has a strictly convex objective function and
a bounded feasible region, it admits a unique solution yα(x). We remark that this modifica-
tion of the gap function φα extends to (EP ) a similar idea developed in [30] for variational
inequalities.
Lemma 2.1 [14] The following statements hold:
a) ϕα is locally Lipschitz continuous on D;
b) x∗ solves (EP) if and only if yα(x∗) = x∗;
c) ϕα is a gap function for (EP);
d) If x ∈ C does not solve (EP) and f is strictly ∇-monotone on D, i.e.
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 > 0, ∀ x, y ∈ D with x 6= y, (2)



































































It is worth noting that it is not possible to replace P (x) by D in (1): ϕα would no longer be
a gap function, and also the fixed-point reformulation in the above lemma would not hold.
The above results suggest to exploit yα(x)−x as a search direction at a given iterate x in
the minimization process of the gap function ϕα. However, the direction yα(x) − x may be
unfeasible because yα(x) belongs to the approximating polyhedron P (x), but not necessarily
to the feasible set C. For this reason, the following exact penalty function has been introduced
in [14]:








i (x) = max{0, ci(x)}, ε > 0 and p ∈ [1,∞]. Given
any α > 0, also the penalty function turns out to be a gap function, provided that the
penalization parameter ε is small enough. In fact, well-known results about penalization [31]
allow to prove the following key properties.
Lemma 2.2 Given any α > 0 and any p ∈ [1,∞], there exists ε¯ > 0 such that
a) ψα,ε,p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ D,
b) x∗ solves (EP) if and only if x∗ ∈ D and ψα,ε,p(x∗) = 0,
for all ε ∈]0, ε¯[.
Proof. Consider any compact set D′ containing D in its interior, namely D ⊂ intD′. By [31,
Proposition 8 and Theorems 11 and 12], there exists ε¯ > 0 such that
argmin{ ϕα(x) : x ∈ C } = argmin{ ψα,ε,p(x) : x ∈ intD′ } (3)
holds for any ε ∈]0, ε¯[. Consider any global minimizer xˆ of ϕα over C: we have both xˆ ∈ C
and ϕα(xˆ) = 0, so that ψα,ε,p(xˆ) = ϕα(xˆ) = 0. Therefore, a) follows immediately since (3)
implies that xˆ is also a minimizer of ψα,ε,p on D. As a consequence, Lemma 2.1 c) and (3)
imply that b) holds as well. 2
The next section introduces two new solution methods for (EP ) based on the minimization
of the penalized gap function ψα,ε,p, which are both convergent under assumption (2).
Actually, a method based on the minimization of the ψα,ε,p has already been proposed



































































iterate is obtained moving away from the current iterate xk along the direction yα(x
k) − xk
if the sufficient decrease condition
ψα,ε,p(x
k)− α [h(xk, yα(xk)) + 〈∇xh(xk, yα(xk)), yα(xk)− xk〉] ≤ −η ψα,ε,p(xk) (4)
is satisfied for some given η ∈]0, 1[ along with two further technical conditions (related to ε).
If this is not the case, a null step is performed simply decreasing both α and ε simultaneously
before trying again to move away from xk with the same procedure. The decrease is run
according to sequences of parameters going to zero. Thus, if the algorithm performs an infinite
sequence of null steps, it generates a sequence of iterates which converges to a solution of (EP)
while the parameters α and ε go to zero.
On the other hand, the assumptions required by this latter method for convergence are
different from those used in this paper. In fact, the above method from [14] is based on the
following concavity-type condition:
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀ x, y ∈ D, (5)
which is neither weaker nor stronger than condition (2) (see Examples 2.5 and 3.2 in [13]).
Furthermore, the following example satisfies both the conditions (2) and (5), and it provides
a case in which the above method could be numerically unstable since the parameters α and
ε actually go to zero. On the contrary, this may never happen in the algorithms of this paper
since α is kept fixed and ε is always updated a finite number of times.
Example 2.1 Consider (EP) with n = 2, m = 1,
f(x, y) = (x1 + x2) y1 + (x2 − x1) y2 − x21 − x22




2 − 1. Therefore, the feasible region C is the unit ball and x∗ = (0, 0) is
the unique solution of (EP). Consider h(x, y) = ‖y− x‖22/2 and the box D = [−1, 1]× [−1, 1]
containing the feasible region. Note that f satisfies (2) since
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 = ‖y − x‖22.
Furthermore, f(·, y) is concave for all y ∈ Rn, hence
0 = f(y, y) ≤ f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉, ∀ x, y ∈ D,
holds for all x, y ∈ D, i.e., f satisfies (5) as well.



































































1. it finds x∗ after a finite number of iterations;
2. it generates a sequence which converges to x∗ while the parameters α and ε are updated
only a finite number of times;
3. it generates a sequence which converges to x∗ while α and ε go to zero.
Unless the starting point of the algorithm is x∗ itself, the first two cases cannot happen.
The first case requires that x∗ = (0, 0) belongs to the segment with x and yα(x) as extreme
points for some x, i.e., yα(x) = γx for some γ < 0. Furthermore, yα(x) is the projection of
zα(x) onto P (x) with
zα(x) = (x1 − (x1 + x2)/α, x2 − (x2 − x1)/α).
In fact, we have
f(x, y) + αh(x, y) = (x1 + x2)y1 + (x2 − x1)y2 − x21 − x22 + α[(y1 − x1)2 + (y2 − x2)2]/2
= α[(y1 − x1 + (x1 + x2)/α)2 + (y2 − x2 + (x2 − x1)/α)2]/2
= α‖y − zα(x)‖2/2,
and therefore
yα(x) = argmin{f(x, y) + αh(x, y) : y ∈ P (x)} = argmin{‖y − zα(x)‖2 : y ∈ P (x)}.
Figure 1 shows that no point γx can ever be the projection of zα(x) onto P (x). Therefore,
yα(x) 6= γx for all γ < 0, which means that the first case can not occur.
In the second case the algorithm generates a sequence xk → x∗ while α is definitely fixed
and the decrease condition (4) holds whenever k is sufficiently large. Clearly, zα(x
k) → x∗
since zα(x) → 0 as x → 0. Hence, zα(xk) ∈ C ⊂ P (xk) holds for any sufficiently large k,
and it implies yα(x
k) = zα(x
k) and therefore ψα,ε,p(x
k) = ϕα(x
k) = ‖xk‖2/α. However, the
decrease condition (4) reads
0 ≤ − η
α
‖xk‖2,
which is not possible. Therefore, also the second case can not occur.
As a result, only the third case can occur: the algorithm generates a sequence which



































































x = (x1, x2)
γ x
(x2,−x1)










c(x) + 〈∇c(x), y − x〉 = 0
Figure 1: Case 1 is not possible (Example 2.1)
3 Descent Methods
While yα(x) − x is a descent direction for ϕα at x, it is not necessarily so for any penalized
gap function ψα,ε,p. Indeed, the key result shows that it is a descent direction also for ψα,ε,p
at x if the parameter ε is small enough. The generalized directional derivative of ψα,ε,p at x
along the direction d, i.e.,
ψ◦α,ε,p(x; d) := lim sup
z→x
t↓0
t−1 [ψα,ε,p(z + t d)− ψα,ε,p(z)] ,
provides a convenient tool to check whether d a descent direction. In fact, if ψ◦α,ε,p(x; d) < 0,
then ψα,ε,p(x+ td) < ψα,ε,p(x) holds whenever t > 0 is small enough.
Theorem 3.1 Let α > 0, p ∈ [1,∞] and Λα(x) be the set of all the Lagrange multipliers
associated to yα(x). If (2) holds and x ∈ D does not solve (EP), then
ψ◦α,ε,p(x; yα(x)− x) < 0,





































































 λi, if ci(x) > 0,0, otherwise,
for any given λ ∈ Λα(x), and ‖ · ‖q is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖p.
Proof. Since x does not solve (EP ), then d := yα(x)−x 6= 0. Considering the convex function
v(x) := ‖c+(x)‖p, then v◦(x; d) coincides with its directional derivative v′(x; d). Thus, the
generalized directional derivative of ψα,ε,p satisfies the following inequality:




The following chain of inequalities and equalities holds:
ϕ◦α(x; d) ≤ −〈∇xf(x, yα(x)) + α∇xh(x, yα(x)), d〉
















The first inequality is actually Theorem 2 (b) in [14], while the second one is due to the strict
∇-monotonicity of f + αh. The subsequent equalities follow from the multipliers’ rule and
the complementarity slackness condition: in fact, we have
∇yf(x, yα(x)) + α∇yh(x, yα(x)) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇ci(x) = 0 (6)
and
λi [ci(x) + 〈∇ci(x), yα(x)− x〉] = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, (7)
since λ is a Lagrange multiplier associated to yα(x). Finally, the last inequality and equality
follow immediately from the definitions. Moreover, the proof of Lemma 4 in [14] shows that
v′(x; d) ≤ −v(x). Thus, we have:
ψ◦α,ε,p(x; d) < 〈λ+, c+(x)〉 − ε−1 ‖c+(x)‖p
≤ ‖λ+‖q ‖c+(x)‖p − ε−1 ‖c+(x)‖p
=




































































since 1/ε ≥ ‖λ+‖q. 2
Note that yα(x)− x is a descent direction for ψα,ε,p at a feasible point x for any ε > 0: in
fact, x ∈ C implies λ+ = 0 and hence 1/ε ≥ ‖λ+‖q holds for all ε > 0. Under assumptions on
f other than strict ∇-monotonicity, this is no longer necessarily true (see [14, Theorem 4]).
The solutions of (EP ) coincide with the global minima of ψα,ε,p on the set D, provided
that ε is small enough (see Lemma 2.2). As a consequence of Theorem 3.1, a further result
holds under the strict ∇-monotonicity of f . In fact, provided that ε is small enough, if (2)
holds, then the stationary points of ψα,ε,p on D, i.e., those x
∗ ∈ D such that
ψ◦α,ε,p(x
∗; y − x∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ D,
solve (EP ). Furthermore, an explicit bound on ε is also available.
Corollary 3.1 Let α > 0, p ∈ [1,∞]. If (2) holds and
1/ε ≥ sup{‖λ+‖q : λ ∈ Λα(x), x ∈ D} ,
then any stationary point of ψα,ε,p on D solves (EP).
Proof. The thesis follows immediately from Theorem 3.1, provided that the bound is finite.
Consider the Lagrangian function
L(y) := f(x, y) + αh(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi[ci(x) + 〈∇ci(x), y − x〉],
where x ∈ D and λ ∈ Λα(x) are fixed. The complementarity slackness condition (7) implies
L(yα(x)) = −ϕα(x), while the multipliers’ rule (6) states that yα(x) is a stationary point of L.
Since L is a convex function, then yα(x) minimizes L on Rn. Considering any point xˆ ∈ Rn
which satisfies the Slater constraint qualification (that is, ci(xˆ) < 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m), the
following chain of inequalities holds:
f(x, xˆ) + αh(x, xˆ) + ϕα(x) ≥
m∑
i=1











































































where ζ := min{−c1(xˆ), . . . ,−cm(xˆ)} > 0. The first inequality simply states L(yα(x)) ≤ L(xˆ),
while the second one follows from the convexity of the functions ci’s. Therefore, we have
‖λ‖1 ≤ [f(x, xˆ) + αh(x, xˆ) + ϕα(x)] /ζ.
The maximum of the right-hand side over D is finite since f , h and ϕα are continuous and
D is compact. Therefore, all the multipliers λ ∈ Λα(x) are uniformly bounded over x ∈ D.
Since ‖λ+‖1 ≤ ‖λ‖1, the same property holds also for all the corresponding vectors λ+: thus,
the bound in the statement is finite. 2
Therefore, any local minimization method could be directly applied for solving (EP )
exploiting a unique penalized gap function, but the computation of the bound would be
required. Actually, this is not necessary: a descent method can be devised moving away from
the current iterate xk along the direction dk = yα(x
k) − xk after updating the penalization
parameter ε just in case it is too big for dk to be a descent direction. Clearly, dk = 0, which
means that xk is a fixed point of the map yα, guarantees that x
k solves (EP ).
Algorithm 1
(0) Choose a sequence ρj ↓ 0, p ∈ [1,∞], α > 0, β, γ ∈]0, 1[, x0 ∈ D. Set ε = ρ0 and k = 0.
(1) Compute yk = arg min{f(xk, y) + αh(xk, y) : y ∈ P (xk)} and λk a corresponding
Lagrange multiplier vector.
(2) If dk := yk − xk = 0, then STOP.
(3) while 1/ε < ‖(λk)+‖q do
set ε = ρj+1 and j = j + 1.
end
(4) Compute the smallest non-negative integer s such that
ψα,ε,p(x
k + γs dk)− ψα,ε,p(xk) ≤ −β γ2s ‖dk‖2,
set tk = γ
s, xk+1 = xk + tk d



































































Theorem 3.2 If (2) holds, then either Algorithm 1 stops at a solution of (EP) after a finite
number of iterations or ε is updated at most a finite number of times and Algorithm 1 produces
a bounded sequence {xk}, such that any of its cluster points solves (EP) and the sequence of
the values {ψα,ε,p(xk)} converges to 0.
Proof. Since there exists M > 0 such that ‖λ‖q ≤ M holds for all x ∈ D and all λ ∈ Λα(x)
(see the proof of Corollary 3.1), the parameter ε is updated at most a finite number of times
and step 3 may never loop indefinitely.
Next, we show that the line search procedure in step 4 is finite. By Theorem 3.1 and the
choice of ε at step 3, ψ◦α,ε,p(x
k; dk) < 0 holds for all k. By contradiction, suppose there exists
an iteration k such that
ψα,ε,p(x
k + γs dk)− ψα,ε,p(xk) > −β γ2s ‖dk‖2
holds for all s ∈ N. Then, taking the limit we get the contradiction
ψ◦α,ε,p(x





k + γs dk)− ψα,ε,p(xk)
] ≥ 0.
If the algorithm stops at x∗ after a finite number of iterations, then the stopping criterion
guarantees that x∗ solves (EP ) thanks to Lemma 2.1.
Now, suppose the algorithm generates an infinite sequence {xk}: the sequence is bounded
since xk is a convex combination of xk−1 and yα(xk), which both belong to D. Consider
any cluster point x∗ of the sequence. Taking the appropriate subsequence {x`}, we have
x` → x∗. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that ε is constant for all the
iterations. Moreover, the continuity of the map yα guarantees d
` → d∗ = yα(x∗) − x∗. We
want to prove d∗ = 0 and therefore that x∗ solves (EP ). By contradiction, suppose d∗ 6= 0.
Since the sequence {ψα,ε,p(xk)} is monotone, decreasing and bounded below, it has a limit.








Moreover, the stepsize rule 4 guarantees
ψα,ε,p(x
`)− ψα,ε,p(x`+1) ≥ β t2` ‖d`‖2 > 0.
Therefore, t` → 0 as `→ +∞ since d∗ 6= 0. Moreover, the inequality
ψα,ε,p
(
x` + t` γ
−1 d`







































































x` + t` γ
−1 d`
)− ψα,ε,p(x`) = 〈ξ`, t` γ−1 d`〉, (9)
where ξ` is a generalized gradient of ψα,ε,p at x
`+θ` t` γ
−1 d`, holds for some θ` ∈]0, 1[. Hence,
(8) and (9) imply
〈ξ`, d`〉 > −β t` γ−1 ‖d`‖2.
On the other hand, we have
ψ◦α,ε,p
(
x` + θ` t` γ
−1 d`; d`




x` + θ` t` γ
−1 d`; d`
)
> −β t` γ−1 ‖d`‖2.
Since x` → x∗, d` → d∗, and t` → 0, we get x` + θ` t` γ−1 d` → x∗. Since ψ◦α,ε,p is upper
semicontinuous as function of (x; d) (see, for instance, [32]), taking the limit we get
ψ◦α,ε,p(x




x` + θ` t` γ
−1 d`; d`
) ≥ 0. (10)
Eventually taking a subsequence, λ` → λ∗ as ` → +∞ for some λ∗ ∈ Rm+ since the sequence
{λ`} bounded. Moreover, we have λ∗ ∈ Λα(x∗) since the set-valued map Λα is closed (see [33,
Lemma 2]). Therefore, 1/ε ≥ ‖(λ`)+‖q implies 1/ε ≥ ‖(λ∗)+‖q, and hence Theorem 3.1
ensures ψ◦α,ε,p(x
∗; d∗) < 0 in contradiction with (10).
Therefore, x∗ solves (EP ). By Lemma 2.2 we have ψα,ε,p(x∗) = 0, and thus 0 is the limit
of the whole sequence {ψα,ε,p(xk)}. 2
The algorithm does not require to check that the penalized gap function is positive at the
current iterate xk. Indeed, ψα,ε,p(x
k) < 0 might happen at some iteration and a descent step
could be taken as well. Anyhow, negative values may be met only as long as the penalization
parameter ε keeps being updated, hence they are possible at most a finite number of times.
In fact, after ε is fixed once and for all, the sequence {ψα,ε,p(xk)} is monotone, decreasing
and goes to 0, which could not happen with negative values.
The main difference between the above algorithm and the one in [14] is about the pa-
rameters’ update. Parameters are updated to guarantee that dk is a descent direction: in



































































two further conditions must be met and α has to be updated too. This difference affects the
behaviour of the parameters meaningfully: in Algorithm 1 α is fixed and ε is updated at most
a finite number of times, while in the other algorithm α and ε change simultaneously and
may actually go to zero (see Example 2.1).
In general, a different kind of line search can be considered too: the term ‖d‖2 may be
replaced by the value of the considered gap function (see [13]). Applying this idea in the
current framework requires some additional care as the solution strategy is based on the
minimization of the penalized gap function ψα,ε,p. While a descent direction can be obtained
in the same way of Algorithm 1, lack of feasibility may create some further troubles. A line
search based on the inequality
ψα,ε,p(x
k + γs dk)− ψα,ε,p(xk) ≤ −β γ2s ψα,ε,p(xk)
may not work. In fact, the right-hand size of the inequality has to be negative. Therefore,
a further check has to be performed to guarantee that the penalized gap function is positive
at the current iterate xk: if it is not so, it is enough to decrease the penalization parameter
ε enough to get a positive value (see Lemma 2.2). Anyway, feasibility may be not achieved
all the same: the method could provide sequences for which the values of the gap function go
to zero, but whose cluster points are not feasible. Adding the penalty term ‖c+(x)‖p to the
right-hand side of the line search inequality allows to get feasibility as well.
Algorithm 2
(0) Choose a sequence ρj ↓ 0, p ∈ [1,∞], α, δ > 0, β, γ ∈]0, 1[, x0 ∈ D. Set ε = ρ0, j = 0 and
k = 0.
(1) Compute yk = arg min{f(xk, y) + αh(xk, y) : y ∈ P (xk)} and λk a corresponding
Lagrange multiplier vector.
(2) If dk := yk − xk = 0, then STOP.
(3) while ψα,ε,p(x
k) ≤ 0 or 1/ε < ‖(λk)+‖q do




































































(4) Compute the smallest non-negative integer s such that
ψα,ε,p(x






set tk = γ
s, xk+1 = xk + tk d
k, k = k + 1 and goto Step 1.
Theorem 3.3 If (2) holds, then either Algorithm 2 stops at a solution of (EP) after a finite
number of iterations or ε is updated at most a finite number of times and Algorithm 2 produces
a bounded sequence {xk}, such that any of its cluster points solves (EP) and the sequence of
the values {ψα,ε,p(xk)} converges to 0.
Proof. The parameter ε is updated at most a finite number of times since all the multipliers
λ ∈ Λα(x) are uniformly bounded over x ∈ D (see the proof of Corollary 3.1). Furthermore,
arguing as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it is easy to show that the line search procedure in
step 4 is finite.
If the algorithm stops at x∗ after a finite number of iterations, then the stopping criterion
guarantees that x∗ solves (EP ) thanks to Lemma 2.1.
Now, suppose the algorithm generates an infinite sequence {xk}: the sequence is bounded
since xk is a convex combination of xk−1 and yα(xk), which both belong to D. Taking the
appropriate subsequence {x`}, we have x` → x∗. Without any loss of generality, we can
assume that ε is constant for all the iterations. By contradiction, suppose that x∗ does not
solve (EP ). If x∗ ∈ C, then
ψα,ε,p(x
∗) + δ‖c+(x∗)‖p = ψα,ε,p(x∗) = ϕα(x∗) > 0.
On the other hand, if x∗ ∈ D\C, then ‖c+(x∗)‖p > 0 and ψα,ε,p(x∗) ≥ 0, since ψα,ε,p(x`) > 0.
Therefore, we have
ψα,ε,p(x
∗) + δ‖c+(x∗)‖p > 0
also in this case. Since the sequence {ψα,ε,p(xk)} is monotone, decreasing and bounded below,








Moreover, the stepsize rule 4 guarantees
ψα,ε,p(x












































































`) + δ‖c+(x`)‖p = ψα,ε,p(x∗) + δ‖c+(x∗)‖p > 0,
then t` → 0 as `→ +∞. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we get
ψ◦α,ε,p(x
∗; yα(x∗)− x∗) ≥ 0 (12)
and 1/ε ≥ ‖(λ∗)+‖q for some λ∗ ∈ Λα(x∗). Therefore, Theorem 3.1 guarantees
ψ◦α,ε,p(x
∗; yα(x∗)− x∗) < 0,
which contradicts (12).
Therefore, x∗ solves (EP ). By Lemma 2.2 we have ψα,ε,p(x∗) = 0, and thus 0 is the limit
of the whole sequence {ψα,ε,p(xk)}. 2
Though Algorithm 2 updates the penalization parameter ε according to a different rule
from Algorithm 1, it is still updated at most a finite number of times, thus preventing the
possible numerical troubles due to arbitrarily small parameters.
4 Conclusions
In the paper, two globally convergent algorithms for solving equilibrium problems with non-
linear constraints have been developed. They are both based on the minimization of a suitable
penalized gap function: at each iteration they solve a convex optimization problem with linear
constraints, but the computation of the generalized derivative of the penalized gap function
is not needed. The rule to update the penalization parameter and the line search are the core
differences between the two algorithm.
This paper extends to equilibrium problems the ideas given in [30] for variational inequal-
ities only. Moreover, explicit rules to update the penalization parameter ε throughout the
iterations are given, while the algorithm in [30] requires the a priori knowledge of a suitable
fixed ε. Furthermore, the new algorithms perform Armijo-type inexact line searches instead
of the rather theoretical exact line search of [30].
The descent methods given in [13,21,23,25,26] do not perform any constraint linearization,
and hence convex optimization problems with nonlinear constraints have to be solved at each



































































convergence of the methods proposed in [21,25,26] requires the strong ∇-monotonicity of the
equilibrium bifunction (see, for instance, [26, condition (15)]), which is a stronger assumption
than the strict ∇-monotonicity condition (2) used in this paper.
While the methods proposed in [13,14,23] converge under assumptions which are neither
stronger nor weaker than condition (2), the behaviour of the regularization and penalization
parameters can be compared. In the algorithms of this paper the regularization parameter α
is fixed and the penalization parameter ε is updated at most a finite number of times, and
thus they are both bounded away from zero. Conversely, α and ε change simultaneously and
may actually go to zero in [14], α is the unique parameter and may go to zero in [13], while
α is fixed but ε (which actually plays the role of a further regularization parameter as no
penalization is involved) always goes to zero in [23].
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